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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

New York Court of Appeals rules that New York City may tax a
non-domiciliary corporation on proceeds received from investment in corporation with business activities in City
In order for a state or locality to impose a tax on a non-domiciliary corporation consistent with the Commerce Clause and the
Due Process Clause,' a nexus must exist between the taxing juris1

See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20, 227-30 (1980).

See generally Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on
Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAx LAW. 37, 54-77 (1987) (describing
contemporary analytical framework of constitutional decisions); Developments in the LawFederal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REV. 953, 956962 (1962) (discussing principles of Commerce Clause and Due Process limitations on state
taxation).
Some commerce clause decisions held that interstate activities were flatly untaxable.
See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 603 (1951)(distinguishing between
taxes on interstate corporations by their direct or indirect effect on interstate commerce).
However, other decisions rejected this line of reasoning and held that a state could charge a
corporation for its fair share of the tax charges without unduly burdening interstate commerce. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938). These cases
decided that the Commerce Clause cannot be used as a shield "to relieve those engaged in
interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the
cost of doing business. 'Even interstate business must pay its way."' Id. (quoting Postal
Tel.-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919)); see also D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988) (stating that conflict occurs when state tries to tax interstate
activities).
The Supreme Court enunciated a four-part analysis to evaluate the validity of state
taxes with respect to the Commerce Clause in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 279 (1977). In Cdmplete Auto, Mississippi's tax on the in-state transportation of
automobiles manufactured out-of-state was found not to violate the Commerce Clause because: "[(1) the] tax [was] applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State[; (2)] the tax [was] fairly apportioned[; (3)] the tax [did] not discriminate against
interstate commerce,[; and (4) the] tax [was] fairly related to the services provided by the
State." Id.; see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-67 (1989) (applying Complete
Auto Transit test).
Early due process decisions looked solely to the geographical relationship between the
taxpayer's activities and the taxing state. See International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246
U.S. 135, 145 (1918). However, subsequent decisions upheld state taxes that taxed out-ofstate business activity. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21
(1920). These taxes were upheld because they apportioned for taxation a company's profit
derived from the company's profit-generating activities within the taxing jurisdiction. Id. To
satisfy due process protection concerns, the Court looks to (1) minimum contacts between
the activities of the interstate business and the taxing state and (2) a rational relationship
between income attributed to the state and the intrastate activities of the taxpayer. Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980). Generally, due process

1223

1224

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1223

diction and the corporate income being taxed.' A nexus is clearly
present when the taxpayer's activities within the forum generate
income.3 The Supreme Court has also found a nexus, in some inrequirements are subsumed within the Commerce Clause analysis. Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treas., 111 S. Ct. 818, 828 (1991). But see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.
Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992) ("[D]ue Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are analytically
distinct."). It is submitted that Quill can be reconciled with previous precedent in cases
where the taxpayer has some tangible connection with the state.
Although not applicable to this Survey, state taxation of non-domiciliary corporations is
further limited by the Foreign Commerce Clause, see Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452 (1979); see also Patrick F. Philbin, Sidestepping Issues of Constitutionality in Reviewing the Application of Worldwide Taxation: Franchise Tax Board
of California v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 671, 672-73 (1990), and the Equal
Protection Clause, see Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 668-69 (1981); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1910). See generally
Mathew J. Zinn & Steven Reed, Equal Protection and State Taxation of Interstate Business, 41 TAX LAW. 83 (1987) (describing Equal Protection limitation on state taxes).
2 Compare the Commerce Clause test applied in Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274, with
the Due Process Clause test applied in Mobil, 445 U.S. at 425. See Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164-67 (1983) ("Under both the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause ... a state may not, when imposing an income-based tax, 'tax value
earned outside its borders.' "(quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S.
307, 315 (1982)); Exxon, 447 U.S. at 219-20 (noting that Constitution requires nexus). But
see Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1916, 1919 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that nexus requirements
stem from due process concerns).
In Quill, the Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate the constitutionality of a
North Dakota statute under both the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause. Quill, 112
S. Ct. at 1907. The statute required an "out-of-state mall-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased
for use within the State." Id.
Because the mall-order company had purposefully availed itself of the forum, the Court
held that the State could establish a due process nexus. Id. at 1910-11. However, the Court
held that the statute violated the Commerce Clause because the petitioner lacked physical
presence within the state and therefore petitioner had no "substantial nexus with the taxing
state." Id. at 1912.
In explaining the distinction between Commerce Clause nexus and due process nexus,
the Court noted the different theoretical underpinnings of the two constitutional provisions.
Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909. The Due Process Clause concerns "whether an individual's connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of control over
him." Id. at 1913. Conversely, the Commerce Clause nexus is driven "not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects
of state regulation on the national economy." Id. While this distinction may be appropriate
when evaluating the first or minimum contacts prong of the due process inquiry, as in Quill,
see id. at 1910, it is less applicable when evaluating the second or fairness prong, see id. at
1913; cf. id. at 1919 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that Court has never found sufficient due
process nexus while finding insufficient Commerce Clause nexus until Quill). If it is fair to
the non-domiciliary corporation to subject it to taxation consistent with due process
precepts, concomitantly, it would not appear to offend interstate notions of comity to force
that corporation to pay a tax. Id. at 1920-21.
1 See Exxon, 447 U.S. at 219-20 (operating income derived from out-of-state subsidiaries may be taxed when taxpayer is operating vertically integrated enterprise); Mobil Oil, 445
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stances, when a non-domiciliary corporation receives investment
income from a separate corporation.4 In that situation, the nexus
requirement is satisfied by the forum activities of the taxpayer
which are said to have contributed to the realization of income
outside the forum.' However, a less certain question is whether an
independent nexus is created when the corporation providing the
investment income to the taxpayer generates this income within
the taxing forum.' Recently, in Allied Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Finance,7 the New York Court of Appeals addressed this question while upholding the constitutionality of New York City's corporate tax." In a 4-3 decision authored by Judge Titone, the court
found that such a nexus existed and held that a jurisdiction may
tax a non-domiciliary corporation on investment income earned
within the taxing jurisdiction, even though it is unrelated to the
U.S. at 436-42 (recognizing that activities of the affiliates and subsidiaries furthered Mobil's
in-state activities).
4 See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 364-66
(1982) (holding retail activities of foreign subsidiaries in foreign country unrelated to retail
activities in taxing state); ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 325-30 (holding income and dividends derived from out-of-state activities unrelated to taxpayer's mining operation in taxing state);
see also Silent Hoist & Crane v. Division of Taxation, 494 A.2d 775, 783-84 (N.J. 1985)
(analyzing "unitary business principle"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985).
The Supreme Court has upheld taxation when some degree of functional integration,
known as a "unitary business" relationship exists between the non-domiciliary taxpayer and
the corporation providing the investment income. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 163-67;
Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 439-40 ("[T]he linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-business principle."); Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of MultijurisdictionalCorporations:Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79
MICH. L. REv. 113, 117-18 (1980) (describing "unitary-business" principle). "Unitary-business principle" analysis satisfies constitutional inquiry because the in-state activities of the
corporate parent supply the necessary due process contacts. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438.
Moreover, tax distribution under the "unitary-business principle" is not unduly burdensome
because the corporation is merely paying to each taxing forum a tax on its proportionate
share of the income attributable to that state. Id. at 445-46.
When evaluating the presence or absence of a unitary business, the Court looks to: (1)
functional integration between the two entities; (2) economies of scale; and (3) interlocking
management. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 179.
' Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438.
6 See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Division of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992). Although the
Court held that taxation of the forum subsidiary's income was unconstitutional under the
unitary-business analysis, the Court did not examine whether the nexus between the income
and the forum rendered the tax constitutional. Id. at 2261-64.
7 79 N.Y.2d 73, 588 N.E.2d 731, 580 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1991).
8 Id. at 75-76, 588 N.E.2d at 732, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 697. New York State taxes corporations similarly. Gary Spencer, Out-of-State Business Income Tax Upheld, 4-3, N.Y.L.J.
Dec. 24, 1991, at 1. One estimate is that the tax supplies 'tens of millions of dollars' to the
State's coffers each year. Id.
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taxpayer's business activities in the taxing jurisdiction."
Bendix, a domiciliary of Michigan, owned 20.6% of ASARCO
Inc.'s ("ASARCO") outstanding common stock.1" ASARCO, a New
Jersey mining and refining corporation, has its headquarters in
New York City.11 In 1981, Bendix received $2,795,137 dividend income and $211,513,354 capital gains income in connection with its
ASARCO stock transactions. 2 Bendix's only other activities in
New York City consisted of its International Group operations,
which were totally unrelated to ASARCO's business operations.1 3
On its corporate tax return, Bendix computed its tax liability
based solely on the amount apportioned for the activities of the
International Group and did not include as income the amount received in connection with its ASARCO stock. 14 A New York City
audit assessed a deficiency against Bendix, which petitioner contested in Supreme Court, New York County.' 5 The court upheld
7
the assessment,' 6 and the Appellate Division affirmed.'
Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 588 N.E.2d at 732, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
10

Id. at 77, 588 N.E.2d at 733, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 698. Allied-Signal, petitioner in this

cause of action, is the successor-in-interest to Bendix. Id. at 78, 588 N.E.2d at 734, 580
N.Y.S.2d at 699. Bendix, a noted corporate predator, was itself swallowed by Allied-Signal
during a takeover battle for Martin Marietta Corp. See Transition for Agee, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1982, at A30.
Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 79, 588 N.E. 2d at 734, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
12 Id.
10 Id. In Allied-Signal, the litigants stipulated that "Bendix and ASARCO were at no
relevant time engaged in a unitary business relationship." Id. at 78 n.6, 588 N.E.2d at 733
n.6, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 698 n.6. The sole function of Bendix's International Group was to develop business abroad. Id. at 77, 588 N.E.2d at 734, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
" Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 77-78, 588 N.E.2d at 733, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 698. The New
York City General Corporate Tax on corporate investment income is calculated by determining a proportionate assessment that "reflects the degree of New York City presence of
the issuers of the securities in which the taxpayer has invested (i.e., the corporations which
have generated the taxpayer's investment income)." Id. at 76-77, 588 N.E.2d at 732-33, 580
N.Y.S.2d at 697-98. The amount of income allocated to the City, and subsequently taxed, is
determined "by multiplying the taxpayer's total investment income by its 'investment allocation percentage' (AP)." Id. at 76, 588 N.E.2d at 732, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 697. The AP is a
percentage representing the proportion of the investment issuer's activity in New York City.
Id. IAP is calculated "by first multiplying the amount of each of the taxpayer's investments
by the percentage of the issuer's entire capital allocated to the City on the issuer's own New
York City return." Id. at 77, 588 N.E.2d at 733, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 698. Then each proportional amount is added together and divided by the total of the taxpayer's investments. Id.
10 Id.

Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner of Fin., 146 Misc. 2d 632, 637, 552 N.Y.S.2d 195,
199 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 167 A.D.2d 327, 327, 562 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77 (1st Dep't 1990),
aff'd, 79 N.Y.2d 73, 588 N.E.2d 731, 580 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1991).
11 Allied-Signal v. Commissioner of Fin.,167 A.D.2d 327, 327, 562 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77 (1st
Dep't 1990), aff'd, 79 N.Y.2d 73, 588 N.E.2d 731, 580 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1991).
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The threshold issue addressed by the Court of Appeals majority was whether the attribution of contacts from the non-domiciliary taxpayer to the corporation producing the investment income-and thus the investment income itself-was necessary to
satisfy constitutional concerns."" Judge Titone first found three recent Supreme Court decisions inapplicable because in each case
the income generating corporation had no ties to the taxing forum. 19 When domestic corporations generate investment income,
the court determined that the proper inquiry was whether "the
taxing power exerted . . . bears fiscal relation to the protection,

opportunities and benefits given by the state."20 Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in InternationalHarvester Co. v. Wisconsin
" Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 80-81, 588 N.E.2d at 734-35, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
19 Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 80-82, 588 N.E.2d at 734-36, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01.
On this point, even the dissenting Judge Bellacosa agreed with the majority that
Woolworth, ASARCO, and Mobil "do not hold that a unitary business relationship between
the taxpayer and the investment income payer is a constitutional sine qua non to municipal
taxation of investment income." Id. at 89, 588 N.E.2d at 741, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Judge Titone addressed petitioner's argument that the lack of a unitary business relationship between Bendix and ASARCO negates any possibility of a sufficient nexus by examining three cases: F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982),
ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), and Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980).
In Woolworth, petitioner sought to avoid tax liability for dividends paid to it by three
wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, and one foreign subsidiary in which it had a controlling
interest. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 356-57, 359. Although the subsidiaries and the parent were
engaged in retail sales, the parent's managerial control over the subsidiaries was decentralized, and the companies were not connected by centralized purchasing, warehousing, or
manufacturing. Id. at 364-67. Thus, the Court held that the state was "attempting to reach
'extra-territorial values' wholly unrelated to the business of the Woolworth stores in the
[taxing state]." Id. at 372 (citation omitted).
In ASARCO, the taxpayer received income from dividends and capital gains from companies in whose stock "it owned a major interest." ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 308-310. Although
the subsidiaries engaged in activities similar to that of the parent, and even though one
subsidiary sold to ASARCO a share of its output which was proportionate to ASARCO's
stock ownership, the court held that the subsidiaries were discrete enterprises. Id. at 320-24.
In Mobil, petitioner's failure to prove that the business activities of its subsidiaries were
unrelated to the parent left the court to consider only whether the foreign source of the
income or the corporate form of the dividend payer rendered the tax unconstitutional. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 437-40. The Court held that the state had the right to tax dividends related
to Mobil's in-state activity. Id. at 439.
20 Id. Although valid as a general proposition, this standard has been criticized as a
source of guidance. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA.L. REv. 149,
159 (1976)("classic but imprecise formulation"); Bernard Schwartz, Commerce, the States,
and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. U. L. Rav. 409, 426 (1979)(noting standard can be reduced to
absurdity).
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Department of Taxation,2 1 the majority held that the City's tax on
the dividend and capital gain income that Bendix received from its
investments in ASARCO, insofar as it was properly premised on
ASARCO's activities within the City, was supported by a sufficient
taxing nexus. 22 The court reasoned that the City indirectly bestowed a benefit on Bendix by directly conferring benefits on
ASARCO that in turn contributed to ASARCO's capital appreciation and its ability to pay substantial dividends.23
Finally, the court held that there was no requirement that the
24
tax be reasonably related to Bendix's own in-state activity.
Rather, the court reasoned that where a tax is "premised on the
presence of an entity other than the taxpayer ... the tax must be
fairly related to that entity's activities within the taxing jurisdic25
tion, not the taxpayer's.
In vehement dissent, Judge Hancock attacked the majority's
2
reasoning. 2 e Citing ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission 7
and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department, s
Judge Hancock argued that the Supreme Court "expressly rejected
the attempts of [states] to expand [nexus concepts] ... to embrace
corporations where, as here, the only claimed relatedness is in the
2'

322 U.S. 435 (1944). In InternationalHarvester, plaintiff contended that the Due

Process Clause prohibited Wisconsin's tax on dividends earned by out-of-state shareholders.
Id. at 439. Four years earlier, in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940), the Court
upheld Wisconsin's taxing scheme as an assessment against the corporation's activities
within the state. Id. at 441-42. After J.C. Penney was decided, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court characterized the tax as a burden imposed solely on the stockholders. See Wisconsin
Gas Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 10 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. 1943). Based on the Wisconsin
Court's holding, International Harvester then argued that a nexus was impossible since the
dividends were declared and paid in another jurisdiction, and ninety-eight percent of the
corporation's shareholders resided out-of-state. InternationalHarvester, 322 U.S. at 446
(Jackson, J., dissenting). The Court upheld the tax, stating that:
A state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly attributable
either to property located in the state or to events or transactions which, occurring
there, are subject to state regulation and which are within the protection of the
state and entitled to the numerous other benefits which it confers.
Id. at 441-42.
22 See Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 82-84, 588 N.E.2d at 736-37, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 701702.
Id.
24 Id. at 84-85, 588 N.E.2d at 737-38, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 702-703.
25 Id.
21 Id. at 92, 588 N.E.2d at 743, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
2" 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
28 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
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financial contribution that one [corporation] makes to the other. 29
Thus, Judge Hancock concluded that it would be unfair to attribute ASARCO's activity in the taxing forum to Bendix where the
corporations similarly lack relatedness.3 0
In a separate dissent, Judge Bellacosa, joined by Chief Judge
Wachtler argued that the activities of Bendix, the taxpayer, rather
than ASARCO, are dispositive when deciding nexus.3 1 Under the'
20 Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 94, 588 N.E.2d at 744, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). In ASARCO and Woolworth, a bare financial relationship-the payment of dividends-did not sustain a due process nexus. See ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 326-29; Woolworth,
458 U.S. at 363-64.
Judge Hancock argued that state taxation is impermissible in the absence of a "unitarybusiness relationship." Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 94, 588 N.E.2d at 744, 580 N.Y.S.2d at
709 (Hancock, J., dissenting). According to Judge Hancock, state taxation is constitutional
so long as the corporation derives some equivalent benefit from the taxing state. Id. at 9697, 588 N.E.2d at 745, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Benefits accrue from
the subsidiary to the taxpayer, he reasoned, only when the aggregate of contacts are such
that the two comprise a unitary business. Id. Thus, the unitary-business principle operates
as "a limitation on the circumstances when such taxation is permitted." Id. at 95, 588
N.E.2d at 745, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
:oAllied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 95-97, 588 N.E.2d at 744-45, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 709-10
(Hancock, J., dissenting). Bendix's relationship with ASARCO was similar to ASARCO's
relationship and Woolworth's relationship with their respective subsidiaries in ASARCO
and Woolworth. Id. Therefore, the tax as applied to Bendix is constitutionally infirm because "the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of
the recipient in the taxing state." Id. at 93-94, 588 N.E.2d at 743, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 708-09
(Hancock, J., dissenting) (quoting Mobil, 455 U.S. at 441-42). Accordingly, Judge Hancock
rejected the notion that ASARCO's own in-state activities accrued to Bendix. Id. at 103-04,
588 N.E.2d at 749-50, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 714 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
31 Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 85, 588 N.E.2d at 738, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). In his analysis, Judge Bellacosa first considered whether Bendix had sufficient
contacts with New York City to support a constitutional nexus, and then determined
whether the tax imposed was reasonably related to those contacts. Id. at 85-91, 588 N.E.2d
at 738-42, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 703-07 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
As to the first determination, Judge Bellacosa focused on the activities of Bendix within
the taxing forum, specifically the activities of Bendix's International Group. Id. at 88, 588
N.E.2d at 740, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Based on this relationship, he
concurred with the majority in result, holding that Bendix had sufficient contacts with the
forum to justify some taxation. Id. As to the second determination, Judge Bellacosa once
again focused on Bendix, foregoing attribution of ASARCO's activities to Bendix. Id. at 91,
588 N.E.2d at 742, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Since the tax was based
on activities unrelated to Bendix, he concluded that it was unreasonable. Id.
Similar to Judge Hancock's analysis, Judge Bellacosa's analysis is predicated on the
assumption that ASARCO's activities cannot be attributed to Bendix. Id. at 90-91, 588
N.E.2d at 741-42, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 706-07 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Essentially, the tax fails
the second prong of Judge Bellacosa's analysis for the same reason it fails Judge Hancock's
nexus test analysis: no relationship exists between the tax and the taxpayer's business activities. However, it is submitted that Judge Bellacosa's proportionality requirement has the
potential to reach an opposite result when the amount of the taxpayer's related activities
dwarfs the amount of the taxpayer's unrelated activities. In that case, the tax may appear
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majority's analysis, he noted, New York City would be "impos[ing]
a clearly offensive and duplicative tax-a governmental version of
32
double-dipping."
Subsequent to the New York Court of Appeals decision, the
United States Supreme Court in Allied-Signal v. Division of Taxation"3 found a similar New Jersey tax unconstitutional based on
the same transaction taxed by New York City.3 4 In that case, New
Jersey attempted to include the capital gains income Bendix derived from its sale of ASARCO stock within Bendix's unitary tax
base for apportionment purposes.3 The New Jersey Supreme
Court found the two corporations sufficiently related to justify the
attribution of contacts from taxpayer to investment," but the
United States Supreme Court found that no such relationship existed and thus the attribution was improper.3 7 Although the Court
noted that when the transaction serves an "operational rather than
an investment function"3 " such a relationship is unnecessary, the
Court held that in this case the ASARCO transaction served only
an investment function. 9 The Supreme Court's decision does not
directly address the New York Court's holding, nevertheless, the
decision indicates that when evaluating the apportionability of a
corporate taxpayer's investment income, the proper focus is on the
taxpayer's activity within the taxing forum and its use of the investment income. 40 Therefore, by implication, it is submitted that
the Court of Appeals erred by focusing on the activities of the corostensively reasonable even though it bears no relationship to the taxpayer's in-state
activities.
.2 Id. at 91, 588 N.E.2d at 742, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
-- 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
1, See id. at 2255-57. As in the New York City scenario, New Jersey was attempting to
tax the unrelated non-business income of a non-domiciliary. See id. Unlike the case decided
by the New York Court of Appeals, the only income before the Supreme Court was the
capital gains income realized from the sale of the ASARCO stock. Id.
35 Id. at 2257.
36 592 A.2d 536, 544 (N.J. 1990).
17 Allied-Signal, 112 S. Ct. at 2263.
11 See id. at 2263-64. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the tax by finding that
Bendix and ASARCO were engaged in a unitary business. Id. Reversing that holding, the
Supreme Court held that no such relationship existed. Id. In reaching its decision, the Court
noted that a unitary business relationship was not necessary to support a tax. Id. at 2263.
Instead, the Court focused on whether the transaction served an operational rather than
investment function. Id.
" Id. at 2263-64.
40

Id.
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poration generating the investment.4 1
Both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause require a state or local tax to fairly apportion the forum tax burden.4 2 However, as Judge Bellacosa noted, New York City's tax on
a non-domiciliary corporation's investment income confers a windfall on New York City because ASARCO theoretically pays for
those state privileges and benefits being attributed to Bendix
through its own tax liability. 43 Thus, New York City incurs no additional liabilities due to Bendix's putative activities.4 4 Although
New York City is admittedly strapped for revenues, allowing such

taxation will only hurt it in the long run. Non-domiciliary corporations will avoid investing in New York City corporations in order
to avoid the current taxation scheme, thus creating a disincentive
for corporations to establish themselves in New York City.45 Perhaps, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, the New York
Court of Appeals will change its position on this issue-the fiscal

41 Id. By focusing on the function of the investment income rather than the subsidiar-

ies' contacts, the Court has implicitly recognized that the relationship between the taxpayer
and the forum is paramount. This analysis renders irrelevant consideration of the relationship between the income source and the forum.
It should be noted that New York City filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in
which it described the New York City tax and the holding of the New York Court of Appeals. Amicus Brief of the City of New York, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992) (No. 91-615). The New
York Court of Appeals decision was neither discussed nor cited in the Supreme Court's
decision.
42 See supra note 2. Such a tax would unduly burden interstate commerce because it
would seek to export the forum tax burden. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct.
1904, 1913 (1992). Such a tax may also violate due process requirements because it would
be over-taxing the non-domiciliary taxpayer and, in effect, taxing value earned outside the
forum's borders. See id. at 1909-10.
43 See Allied-Signal, 79 N.Y.2d at 90-91, 588 N.E.2d at 741-42, 580 N.Y.S.2d 706-07;
see note 15 and accompanying text. This exposes the underlying fallacy behind the attribution of ASARCO's activities to Bendix. Under the majority's reasoning, those activities are
being taxed twice, once by ASARCO and once by Bendix.
" See id.
45 See JER AE R. HELLERsTEiN, STATE TAXATIN § 9.11[2], at 539 n.210 (1983). Practically speaking, the tax has the disadvantage of discouraging corporate investment in corporations domiciled in New York City. Id. Corporations should tend to invest in jurisdictions
where they would only be subject to taxation once. Id. However, New York State considers
the tax a business advantage because investment income is apportioned and not totally allocated to the jurisdiction. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 1. New York State and New York
City believe that they tax proportionately less of a corporation's investment income than
other jurisdictions. See id.
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integrity of New York City must not come at the expense of the
Constitution.
Brian E. Kennedy

